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Concern for alleviating human suffering in times of crisis is long-standing; it can be traced as 
far back as the 697 AD Cain Adomnain, to Vattel’s call in 1758 for nations to contribute to aid 
in other nations suffering from disaster such as in the aftermath of the earthquakes in Portugal, 
and the eventual emergence of the International Committee of the Red Cross and Red Crescent 
after Henri Dunant observed the aftermath of the battle at Solferino in 1859. However, the 
complexity of humanitarian crises and of designing appropriate responses thereto continues to 
challenge the international community. Even a cursory glance at a newspaper verifies this; from 
Yemen where there is now a large-scale outbreak of cholera amidst the conflict, to the 
displacement of millions people due to conflicts in Syria and Sudan, and FARC offering support 
to the town of Mocoa where a mudslide killed over 300 people, humanitarian crises are 
complex, often transnational, and multi-actor. In contrast with human rights and humanitarian 
actors, international law and the international community’s response to disasters tends to be 
driven by the type of disaster in question, and particular whether it is caused by conflict, 
displacement, or natural or manmade disasters. In other words, international law on disaster 
exists at present in silos, with different regimes applying to different situations, and ineffective 
responses to the real nature of complex crises. As between those silos there is a hierarchy of 
laws in response to human suffering, with the laws of war and human rights law more 
embedded, compared to the softer law approaches that tend to characterise responses to 
disasters or are aimed at the protection of displaced persons.  
Dug Cubie’s book proposing an acquis humanitaire comes at an auspicious time; when 
the need to cohere these seemingly disparate legal regimes is clear. Having worked as a 
practitioner and witnessed first-hand disasters, conflicts and displacements in the field over the 
past decade and a half, Cubie is well-placed to find a way forward for humanitarian action. 
While conflict, displacement and disaster are being precipitated and compounded by the wider 
impact of global warming, he shows that international law and the international community’s 
response is moving, and should continue to move, from silos to a more comprehensive body of 
law. Cubie suggests that there is a ‘common conceptual and operational thread running through 
our preparations for and responses to a broad range of different humanitarian crises…’1 to the 
extent that there is an emerging ‘law of humanitarian assistance’. Tracing these movements, 
Cubie proposes an acquis humanitaire as a framework to draw together the existing diffuse 
strands of policy, law and practice on humanitarian action into a principle based on human 
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dignity and humanity. This would improve accountability for failure to ensure the protection of 
persons in times of humanitarian crisis.  
Part I of the book sets out the conceptual framework of the acquis humanitaire 
beginning with the foundations of humanitarianism. Cubie explores the underpinnings of 
humanitarianism, noting that the imperative for humanitarian action is found in moral or ethical 
obligations, rather than legal ones, enabling states and humanitarian agencies to interpret it 
from their own institutional or philosophical stance. Indeed such tensions on the philosophical 
basis of interventions have witnessed splits within large humanitarian organisations, such as 
Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) breaking away from the ICRC in 1971 over the Biafra 
conflict. Moreover, different agencies and states operate under a range of ambits, whether on 
just ‘humanitarian assistance’ to the much broader ‘humanitarian action’ that includes a array 
of activities ‘at all stages of the emergency prevention, mitigation and response, not simply 
material assistance.’2 In addition, Cubie argues the protection of persons plays a fundamental 
part alongside humanitarian assistance. It is here that international law has taken a stronger role 
in obliging states to take preventive and responsive actions, which are explored in later chapters 
in Part II. Together Cube tempers these two principles with realities on the ground under the 
headings of hazards, vulnerability and resilience. Cubie then briefly traces these tenets of 
humanitarianism in the laws of war and disaster law, finding that, in spite of some differences 
in substance and practice, there are two common underpinning principles: ‘humanity’ and 
‘respect for human dignity’. These then form the starting point for his acquis humanitaire.  
 In Chapter Two Cubie defines the parameters of his acquis humanitaire. While not a 
strict definition, he outlines the that acquis humanitaire is a ‘body of laws, policies and 
practices relating to the protection of persons in humanitarian crises.’3 He takes a ‘broad tent’ 
approach, demarcating a conceptual framework for engaging and discussing humanitarian 
action that draws from legal and non-legal sources followed by states and agencies. Indeed this 
wide umbrella includes hard and soft law, and both needs-based and rights-based approaches 
to humanitarian action. As such, it is intended to provide a one-stop-shop for states, civil society 
and institutional agencies to find common ground on law and practice so as to provide a 
conceptual basis and ‘space for discussion’ in moving forward the creation of new law in this 
area.4 Cubie delineates that there are three constituent parts of the acquis humanitaire: (1) the 
prime objective of the protection of persons, (2) the conceptual basis of humanity and human 
dignity, and (3) accountability mechanisms provided by international and domestic oversight. 
These three parts are inter-related and mutually supportive, but will vary depending on the 
humanitarian crisis. The acquis draws from a wide range of international law, from 





humanitarian crises to refugee law, the law of armed conflict, and disaster law. Despite this 
diversity, there are emerging legal instruments that connect these conceptual and legal spheres, 
such as the AU Kampala Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced 
Persons. Yet there are also tensions, such as a rights-based vs. a needs-based approach, the 
proliferation of laws and forums, and the increasing variety of humanitarian actors. Cubie never 
shies away from these tensions, instead recognising and tackling them head on throughout the 
book. 
 In Chapter 3 Cubie interrogates the prime objective of the acquis humanitaire of the 
protection of persons, looking at the international legal context and the frictions between the 
rights-based and needs-based approaches to humanitarian action. He finds that a human rights 
protection approach should not be completely and blindly endorsed during by humanitarian 
actors in responding to crises, but can inform humanitarian organisations in their operations. 
He argues that four human rights principles can be useful at such a juncture: empowerment of 
rights-holders, participation in decision-making processes, non-discrimination and 
prioritisation of vulnerable groups, and accountability of duty-bearers to rights-holders. Whilst 
these principles will not by themselves ensure individuals’ rights in humanitarian crises, they 
may ensure procedural fairness for affected communities. Such a stance may not please some 
human rights actors, but Cubie’s framework offers a useful and workable way to ensue the 
integration of human rights in these situations, while still allowing that a more specialised 
regime may have lex specialis status. 
 Chapter 4 acknowledges the challenges in developing the normative promise of the 
acquis humanitaire across the different international legal spheres. Cubie draws upon Harold 
Koh’s theory of norm internalisation via transnational legal process for promoting compliance 
and implementation of the acquis humanitaire by actors involved in humanitarian action. Such 
norm implementation comes into conflict with state sovereignty and state consent and, as in all 
areas of international law, that conflict inhibits action; in this case military intervention and the 
establishment of the responsibility to protect doctrine. On the other hand, humanitarian crises 
can also be used as a pretext to undermine a state’s government and governance structures, as 
happened in Ukraine/Crimea. Intervention, particularly the use of military force, can 
‘exacerbate the suffering of the affected population’5 so that greater legal accountability is 
needed at the international and domestic level to ensure that states and other responsible actors 
respect the law in humanitarian crises and honour its central purpose: the protection of the 
civilian population. 
 Part II of the book maps out the normative content of the acquis humanitaire through 
the five bodies of international law of which it is composed: international human rights law, 
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the law of armed conflict, international criminal law, international disaster law, and refugee and 
displaced persons law. Starting with Chapter 5, Cubie surveys the position of international 
human rights law and its implications for humanitarian crises, focusing in particular on the 
rights to access to protection and assistance, an adequate standard of living, and physical 
security and integrity. He finds that a right to humanitarian assistance in all types of 
humanitarian crises remains debateable and has not yet solidified in human rights law. 
However, the benefit for Cubie of engaging with a human rights approach for humanitarian 
action is that it can promote a more effective way to protect persons in such crises through 
rights discourse, such as the inclusion of affected communities in decision-making processes 
on humanitarian assistance. Cubie tempers such optimism with a caveat that human rights law 
is ‘not necessarily the panacea for strengthening the protection of persons in humanitarian 
crises.’ 6  This position plays into his construction of the acquis humanitaire as a broad 
framework drawing from different legal spheres, where even international humanitarian law in 
certain circumstances can provide greater protection than human rights law. 
 Chapter 6 turns to examine the law of armed conflict and its place in the acquis 
humanitaire, drawing upon the examples of humanitarian flotillas to Gaza, state-building and 
the occupation of Iraq by US-led forces, and cross-border humanitarian operations in Syria. 
While the law of armed conflict has specific provisions on humanitarian operations and 
obligations on belligerents to respect the work of relief societies (such as the protection of relief 
personnel), the law does differ depending on whether the conflict is international or non-
international. Cubie finds that although the law of armed conflict recognises that individuals 
have a right to request humanitarian assistance during international armed conflicts, it is very 
much constrained by military considerations. For non-international armed conflicts the legal 
terrain is much bleaker: relief societies’ ability to offer and provide assistance to the civilian 
population suffering undue hardship is predicated on the consent of the affected state. 
Connected to his earlier argument on accountability, Cubie highlights the practical challenges 
that arise as humanitarian actors are increasingly being directly targeted by belligerents in order 
to cause further suffering to civilian populations, gain political capital or remove international 
organisations from their territory. Rarely is anyone held responsible for these actions. 
Resolving this is perhaps beyond the scope of Cubie’s study, but the targeting of relief agencies 
and humanitarian actors clearly places important practical obstacles in the way of delivering 
humanitarian assistance in real terms. 
 In Chapter 7 Cubie assesses the protection of persons in international criminal law. 
Despite the protection afforded to humanitarian actors in the laws of war and similar provisions 
on criminalisation in international criminal law, attacks continue to be made against them, with 
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few prosecutions. Cubie considers in particular war crimes involving attacks against 
humanitarian personnel and medical facilitates, misuse of emblems, and the use of starvation 
as a means of warfare. This he does by examining case studies in Afghanistan, Syria and 
Bosnia. Cubie also discusses the implications of wilful denial of humanitarian assistance 
amounting to genocide, drawing upon the Al-Bashir case at the ICC.7 While there is not an 
explicit recognition of such wilful denial as constituting genocide, the jurisprudence in the 
Akayesu case at the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) suggests that the 
deliberate infliction of conditions intended to cause physical destruction of the group can 
amount to genocide.8 However, Cubie notes that genocide has a high threshold of special intent 
to destroy, in whole or in part, a protected group. He then turns to examine the potential for 
crimes against humanity to occur when civilian populations are mistreated, including in the 
aftermath of disasters, such as the delayed response for humanitarian aid in Myanmar after 
Cyclone Nargis. Again satisfying the evidential requirements of proving mistreatment through 
the contextual elements of crimes against humanity of widespread or systematic attacks 
directed against a civilian population may make such a prosecution difficult, but not impossible. 
Nonetheless there is an increasing recognition that intentional attacks or barriers to 
humanitarian assistance that result in the deaths of civilians can amount to international crimes 
in war and peace. Such criminalisation may provide a deterrent effect, but given the lack of 
prosecutions for denying humanitarian assistance or targeting humanitarian workers it remains 
questionable whether it would be an effective tool in fighting for the protection of persons with 
humanitarian needs in crises. 
 Chapter 8 surveys international disaster laws. Although these laws have only recently 
captured the attention of academics and practitioners, Cubie argues that they include a range of 
initiatives over the past 100 years. Most of the law comes from UN resolutions, declarations 
and guidelines or draft international instruments (such as the ILC draft articles on humanitarian 
response and recovery),9 reflecting the proliferation of soft law in this corpus. That said there 
has been increasing awareness amongst different actors to improve the response to 
humanitarian disasters, such as the Disaster Risk Reduction, Prevention and Preparedness 
(DRR) agenda. Cubie offers the 2004 tsunami in the Indian Ocean that killed 226,000 people 
across 14 countries and the post-earthquake intervention in Haiti and subsequent cholera 
outbreak as examples of where hard lessons have been learned in responding to large-scale 
disasters with multiple agencies and organisations. While there is a nascent field of 
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international disaster law, it remains very much in soft law practice of promoting the protection 
of persons, but does provide a fertile area of growth for the acquis humanitaire.  
 Chapter 9 is the last piece of the normative acquis humanitaire outlined in Part II. Here 
Cubie considers the place of refugee and displaced persons law in the protection of persons in 
humanitarian crises. This area comprises both hard law (especially the 1951 UN Convention 
Relating to the Status of Refugees) and soft law, both of which are canvassed by Cubie who 
focuses especially on. legal and resettlement solutions to sexual and gender-based violence in 
Bhutanese refugee camps in Nepal, and the internalisation of guiding principles of internal 
displacement in Colombia to illustrate their operation. This area of law reflects the intertwined 
links between the different normative bases of the acquis humanitaire, where in the aftermath 
of conflict or disaster it can have an knock-on effect on the location, living conditions and legal 
situation of civilians both domestically and internationally. This is apparent in Syria, where 
large-scale and long-term conflict has witnessed the displacement of civilian population within 
and outside the country’s borders, which requires an understanding of the different and 
interrelated parts of international law in responding to such a humanitarian crisis. 
 The final part of the book draws together the conceptual and substantive aspects of the 
acquis humanitaire. Chapter 11 reflects on whether or not a general right to humanitarian 
assistance has crystallised in international law. Cubie finds that there is a limited individual 
right to request and receive humanitarian assistance from aid agencies in armed conflict, but 
there are no avenues for redress to seek compliance for this right, and such a right differs 
between international and non-international armed conflicts. This would suggest a lack of legal 
basis for an individual right classically understood. In times of peace, Cubie points out that a 
right to humanitarian assistance only exists in refugee law for children, although there have 
been suggestions that this should be broadened to include internally displaced persons.10 This 
is a sensible development given the high numbers of civilians who died because of conflict 
displacement and lack of assistance, such as in the conflict in eastern Congo. What does seem 
a stronger basis in international law is the entitlement of humanitarian agencies to offer 
assistance, but this often is limited by states not giving consent, reflecting the overbearing 
nature of international law’s commitment to sovereignty over the protection of persons. As such 
Cubie, acknowledges that the right to humanitarian assistance is starting to crystallise, but more 
work needs to be done in to achieve the overarching goal of the protection of persons in 
humanitarian crises. Despite this, in his final chapter Cubie remains optimistic that the broad-
tent, flexible approach of the acquis humanitaire can contribute to better attaining the 
protection and assistance of persons in humanitarian crises. Accordingly the acquis 
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humanitarian remains the best way to actualise our underlying goals of humanity and human 
dignity in times of crises. 
In all, Cubie’s monograph pulls together the different strands of international law in 
the face of ever-complex humanitarian crises to shape a well-thought out and sober approach 
to humanitarian action. The valuable contribution this book makes to the number of fields it 
touches upon is clear, but it also potentially provides a pivot point for our legal and practical 
continuum as an international community in how we respond to some of the greatest challenges 
we face as the human race. It is apparent that this book will be helpful for practitioners in the 
field of humanitarian assistance, a vital guide to policy makers in developing legal responses 
and states’ obligations in humanitarian crises, and a provocation to scholars in the disparate 
areas of law Cubie engages with. Yet the value of this book is not just in how it speaks to and 
moves the debate on for different stakeholders, but how it pulls together the key principles of 
humanity and human dignity to illustrate how, as an international community, we can respond 
to and reduce the suffering of humankind when war and disaster strike. 
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